Approved For Release 2005/08/12 : CIA-RDP80B01495R0 0100120009-2

1415 hours 4 October 73

STAT

	Dr. Martin:
STAT	1. on behalf of DDS&T, has no problems with our draft memo other than the two points raised by DDI's memo.
STAT	2. On the reference to NOIWON, he says that his understanding of the DCI's reaction to the recent briefing (by General Graham or his people, I believe, re a Family of Products) was to not commit himself on the interrelation or competition between NOIWON and NIOC. Therefore, thinks that this paragraph should be deleted in our draft letter to PFIAB. I have no basis for judgment, not having attended the meeting.
STAT	takes a middle ground between our original draft and Paul Wahsl's change of the first paragraph. He accepts the need to avoid appearing to now try to undo the history of the past months, in which ASD(I) has been named Executive Agent and is operating in conjunction with IC Staff to address the questions raised by PFIAB. On the other hand, his recollection of the meeting with the DCI (Management Committee meeting?) is as follows:
	a. An internal CIA committee, including representation of DDS&T and DDI, is to be formed, including computer experts, analyst users, etc. This group is to be charged with the formulation for the DCI of a concept paper that will delineate objectives, look at the possible contribution of CIA files to a community effort, CIA's need for COINS, and CIA's views on type(s) of systems. The results of this effort were to provide a basis for working with ASD(I) representative(s) to develop a community paper.
STAT	b. thinks that the DCI's letter to PFIAB should state that he is at work on a concept paper, since this appears to be the main thrust of Admiral Anderson's letter.
STAT	suggests that we might rework the 4th sentence of para. 1 of our draft letter, stressing "concept paper" as end product. Behind the scenes, he suggests there could be an internal memo of understanding between IC and CIA DDs, promptly setting up the in-house committee. Meanwhile, to avoid appearing to be stalling on moving ahead with ASD(I), perhaps the chairman of the internal CIA committee could start with ASD(I) on aspects of the problem where CIA is not significantly involved.